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Surf-n-Turf, but the Sustainable Kind? The Limits and 
Potential of Market-Driven Regulation in Food 
Production 
Zdravka Tzankova† & Lauren Gwin‡ 
This article examines the dynamics and likely effects of NGO efforts 
at private, market-driven regulation of antibiotics use in US agricul-
ture. Such NGO efforts aim to eliminate the routine feeding of anti-
biotics to healthy animals for the purposes of prophylaxis and growth 
promotion. To that end, NGOs are pressing large food retailers, who 
are some of the most powerful market actors, to demand antibiotic-
free meat and to refuse selling meat produced with sub-therapeutic 
use of antibiotics.  
Curbing agricultural overuse of antibiotics is critically important for 
public health because overuse erodes the curative power of antibiot-
ics by creating antibiotic resistant animal and human pathogens. The 
NGO turn to the market as a source of private power and authority 
for curbing such overuse is motivated by the ongoing success of ag-
ricultural and pharmaceutical interests in blocking public regulatory 
controls. 
This article evaluates the potential for retailer-targeting NGO initi-
atives to reform the use of antibiotics in US agriculture, drawing on 
insights from analyzing similar market-based initiatives by NGOs 
seeking to reform ecologically problematic practices in the fisheries 
sector.  
This cross-sector comparison suggests that even if market-based an-
tibiotic reform initiatives prove limited in their private regulatory 
achievements, they still have considerable transformative potential. 
Even if the market power and private regulatory authority of targeted 
retailers proves insufficient to change problematic antibiotic uses, 
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for example, the NGO focus on retailers can still advance the public 
regulatory reform of antibiotics in agriculture by turning politically 
influential retailers into major beneficiaries and supporters of such 
reform. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 In 2012, Thanksgiving and Christmas brought petitioners and press 
conferences to Trader Joe’s stores in cities across the United States.1 At 
these events, the Consumers Union (CU), joined by environmental and 
medical Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), urged Trader Joe’s to 
stop selling “meat on drugs,” i.e., meat2 produced through the prophylactic 
and growth promoting use of antibiotics on agricultural livestock.3 
 It is a common practice in the United States to give food animals4 
sub-therapeutic doses of various antibiotics in order to accelerate weight 
gain and prevent illness associated with the stress and crowding of 
intensive animal operations.5 As a result, most of the meat currently 
produced and sold in the United States is “meat on drugs.”6 It is well 
documented that such pervasive and medically unnecessary agricultural 
use of antibiotics presents serious public health risks.7 This is primarily 
                                                 
1. Allison Aubrey, Campaign For Antibiotic-Free Meat Targets Trader Joe’s, NPR (Oct. 2, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/10/02/162164502/campaign-for-antibiotic-free-meat-
targets-trader-joes. Trader Joe’s Urged to Get “Joe the Pig” Off Drugs for the Holidays, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/2012/12/trader-joes-
urged-to-get-joe-the-pig-off-drugs-for-the-holidays.html.  
2. In this article, “meat” refers to meat and poultry.  
3. Amy R. Sapkota et al, What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal 
Feed Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health, 115 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES no. 5, at 663-670 (May 2007). L Tollefson, & M.A. Miller, Antibiotic Use in Food 
Animals: Controlling the Human Health Impact, 83 JOURNAL OF AOAC INTERNATIONAL no. 2, at 
245-254 (2000). Mary D. Barton, Antibiotic Use in Animal Feed and Its Impact on Human Health, 13 
NUTRITION RESEARCH REVIEWS no. 2, at 279-299 (2000). HC Wegener, Antibiotics in Animal Feed 
and Their Role in Resistance Development, 6 CURRENT OPINION IN MICROBIOLOGY, no. 5, at 439-445 
(2003). 
4. “Food animals” refers to domestic livestock raised for slaughter and processing into food. 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE USE OF DRUGS IN FOOD ANIMALS: BENEFITS AND RISKS (The 
National Academies Press ed., 1999). 
5. Saptoka et al, supra note 3.    
6. Situation Analysis of Antibiotic Misuse in U.S. Food Animals: APUA Background Paper, 
APUA (2010), http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/news/newsletter_33_3555326098.pdf.  
7. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE EVOLVING THREAT OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: 
OPTIONS FOR ACTION (2012). Guidance to Industry # 209: The Judicious Use of Medically Important 
Drugs in Food Producing Animals, FDA (April 13, 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIn
dustry/UCM216936.pdf. Mary J. Gilchrist et al, The potential role of concentrated animal feeding 
operations in infectious disease epidemics and antibiotic resistance, 115 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES, no. 2, at 313 (2007). Prescription for Trouble: Using Antibiotics to Fatten Livestock, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/our-failing-food-
system/industrial-agriculture/prescription-for-trouble.html#.VPU-8LDF_Iw (last visited Spring 
2015).  
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because it increases antibiotic resistance in animal and human pathogens, 
eroding the curative power of critically important antibiotics.8 
 Significant public risks and costs are thus associated with the private 
benefits that pharmaceutical companies and various agribusiness actors 
derive from the current agricultural practices of antibiotic overuse.9 Yet 
both public policy and the public regulatory process have repeatedly failed 
to reform such problematic agricultural practices, thwarted by political 
opposition from a powerful alignment of agricultural and pharmaceutical 
interests.10  
 NGO targeting of Trader Joe’s, which has continued since 2012,11 is 
part of a broader NGO effort to use market forces to advance long-elusive 
agricultural antibiotics reform. Specifically, NGOs aim to mobilize and 
deploy the buying power and private regulatory authority of powerful 
market actors.12 To that end, CU and its allies are asking the thirteen largest 
US grocery retailers and the largest US fast food chains—major corporate 
                                                 
8. See also J.L. Rinsky et al, Livestock-Associated Methicillin And Multidrug Resistant 
Staphylococcus Aureus Is Present Among Industrial, Not Antibiotic-Free Livestock Operation 
Workers In North Carolina, 8 PLOS ONE 8 no. 7, at e67641 (2013). Michael Z. David et al, Increasing 
Burden of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus Hospitalizations at US Academic Medical 
Centers, 2003–2008, 33 INFECTION CONTROL no.8, at 782-789. Joseph Stromberg, Factory Farms 
May Be Ground-Zero For Drug Resistant Staph Bacteria, SMITHSONIAN.COM (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/factory-farms-may-be-ground-zero-for-drug-
resistant-staph-bacteria-6055013/?no-ist.  
9. See PEW ANTIBIOTICS RESISTANCE PROJECT, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/anti 
biotic-resistance-project (last visited Spring 2012). Fergus Walsh, Antibiotics resistance 'as big a risk 
as terrorism' - medical chief, BBC NEWS: HEALTH (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-
21737844. Raising resistance: Industrial production of livestock—and antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
that threaten human health¸ NRDC (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.nrdc.org/health/files/raisingresistance.pdf.  
10. Avinash Kar, Antibiotic resistance rising, but FDA can't resist letting industry have things 
its way, SWITCHBOARD: NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://.nrdc.org/blogs/akar/antibiotic_resistance_rising_b.html. Rep. Slaughter: Voluntary Reg 
ulation on Antibiotics Inadequate To Protect Public Health; No Enforcement Mechanism or Criteria 
for Success, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.louise.house.gov/press-releases/rep-slaughter-voluntary-regulation-on-antibiotics-
inadequate-to-protect-public-health-no-enforcement-mechanism-or-criteria-for-success/. Mae Wu, 
Breaking Down the President's Plan on Combating Antibiotic Resistance, SWITCHBOARD: NATURAL 
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Sept. 18, 2014), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blog 
s/mwu/today_the_president_announced.html.   
11. See Consumers Union Ad Urges Trader Joe’s To Help Curb a Major Public Health Crisis, 
CONSUMERREPORTS.org (Sept. 24, 2014), http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom 
/2014/09/campaign-calls-on-grocer-to-stop-selling-meat-raised-on-antibiotics-seattle-wa-in-afull-
page-adappearing-in-the-seatt.html.  
12. Meat on Drugs: The Overuse of Antibiotics in Food Animals, and What Supermarkets and 
Consumers Can Do to Stop It, CONSUMER REPORTS (June 2012), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/content/dam/cro/news_articles/health/CR%20Meat%20On%20Dr
ugs%20Report%2006-12.pdf. See also Letter from Rep. Louise M. Slaughter to Fast Food Restaurants 
(Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.louise.house.gov/uploads/fast_food_letter.pdf.  
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actors with significant buying power and private regulatory authority 
within the food industry—to force change in antibiotic use by demanding 
antibiotic-free meat 13 from their upstream suppliers and phasing out the 
sale of any meat produced by routinely administering antibiotics to healthy 
animals.14  
 As the latest salvo in a long and multi-front battle to reduce the use 
of medically important antibiotics in US meat production,15 these NGO 
initiatives for market-based private regulation seem to offer an important 
new reform strategy. 
 A growing body of scholarship and practical experience points to the 
increasing power of retailers to affect upstream actors along the food 
supply chain, and to the ways that retailers, sometimes acting under 
pressure from NGOs, have used their market power as a source of private 
regulatory authority, demanding and getting technical, labor, or 
environmental changes in the practices of agricultural producers and/or 
other upstream suppliers.16 Both scholarship and practical experience 
further point to the power of a well-structured, forceful, and sustained 
NGO campaign—a corporate targeting campaign that combines 
individualized and sector-wide pressure on closely competing and 
                                                 
13. In this article, “antibiotic-free” refers to meat produced without sub-therapeutic uses for 
prophylactic and/or growth promotion reasons. The focus of the CU campaign—and thus the present 
analysis—is on eliminating the sub-therapeutic—both prophylactic and growth promoting uses of 
antibiotics. The occasional veterinary use of antibiotics for properly therapeutic purposes—i.e., to treat 
sick animals—is not at issue in the CU campaign, and not of concern to the present analysis.    
14. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 10. See also Letter from Rep. Louise M. Slaughter to Fast 
Food Restaurants, supra note 12.  
15. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Natural Resources 
Defense Council Inc. v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11 Civ. 3562), available at 
http://docs.nrdc.org/health/files/hea_11052501a.pdf. Kurt R. Karst, In Litigation Over Animal Feed 
Antibiotic Withdrawals, District Court Says FDA Needs to Move Forward, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/08/in-litigation-over-animal-
feed-antibiotic-withdrawals-district-court-says-fda-needs-to-move-forward.html. See also Newly 
Disclosed Documents Show FDA Allows Livestock Antibiotics Use Despite “High Risk” to Humans, 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140127a.asp (last visited 
Spring 2015).  
16. Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-industrial complex, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/17/the-ngo-industrial-complex/. Doris Fuchs et al., Retail power, 
private standards and sustainability in the global food system, in CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL 
AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 29-60 (J. Clapp and D. Fuchs, eds., 2009). Susanne Freidberg, The Ethical 
Complex of Corporate Food Power, 22 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING no. 4, at 513-532 (2004). David 
Burch & Geoffrey Lawrence, Supermarket Own Brands, New Foods, and the Reconfiguration of Agri-
Food Supply Chains, in SUPERMARKETS AND AGRI-FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS: TRANSFORMATIONS IN 
THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF FOODS 100-128 (David Burch & Geoffrey Lawrence eds., 
2007). Maki Hatanaka et al., Third-Party Certification in the Global Agrifood System, 30 FOOD 
POLICY 354 (2005).  
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reputationally-sensitive corporate retailers—to get such retailers to heed 
NGO demands.17  
 The CU-led campaign has several predecessors, which successfully 
used corporate targeting and reputational pressure on branded big buyers 
to mobilize and deploy their market power and private authority towards 
improving environmental and labor practices in food and commodities 
production.18 Spelling further promise, the targets of the CU-led NGO 
campaign collectively control most of the US retail market for meat.19  
 At the same time, however, the success of retailer targeting as a tool 
for private, market-based regulation of food production is dependent on 
the combination of retailer incentives to heed NGO demands and retailer 
capacity to project market power and private authority in the ways 
demanded by NGOs.20 The success of this type of campaign depends on 
the structure and balance of power along a retailer’s supply chain,21 which 
affects whether targeted retailers can actually force change. In addition, 
retailers are unlikely to take NGO-appeasing actions when such actions 
carry more competitive and profit risk than the potential reputational 
damage caused by disappointed NGOs.22 
 Here we consider all of these dynamics to examine the potential of 
recently launched NGO initiatives to improve antibiotic use practices in 
US agriculture. Our analysis looks for direct as well as indirect regulatory 
and practical effects of this NGO campaign. In doing so, it draws on key 
insights from recent NGO experience with retailer targeting as a strategy 
for market-driven private regulation. Most importantly, we draw on the 
                                                 
17. Zdravka Tzankova, Interactions Between Public and Private Resource Governance: Key 
Insights From The Fisheries Case, WM. & MARY POLICY REV. (Fall 2015). Dara O’Rourke, Market 
Movements: Nongovernmental Organization Strategies to Influence Global Production and 
Consumption, 9 J. OF INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY no. 1-2, at 115-128 (2005). Debora L. Spar & Lane T. 
La Mure, The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs on Global Business, 45 CALIFORNIA 
MANAGEMENT REVIEW no. 3, at 78-101 (2003). Paul A. Argenti, Collaborating with Activists: How 
Starbucks Works With NGOs, 47 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW no. 1, at 91-116 (2004).  
18. Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Creating markets for eco-labeling: are consumers insignificant?, 13 
INTERNATIONAL J. OF CONSUMER STUDIES no. 5, at 477-489 (2006). Tzankova, supra note 17. 
O’Rourke, supra note 17. Gereffi et al., supra note 16.  
19. Jean Halloran, CU Director of Food Policy Initiatives, Pers. Comm., Sept. 19. 2013; see also 
2014 Top 75: The clickable list, SUPERMARKET NEWS, http://supermarketnews.com/2014-top-75-
clickable-list (last visited Spring 2015).  
20. Frederick Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and 
Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUSINESS AND POLITICS no. 3 (2010). Argenti, supra note 17. Spar 
and La Mure, supra note 17.   
21. Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 20.  
22. Spar and La Mure, supra note 17. Argenti, supra note 17. Stefano Ponte, The Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) and the Making of A Market for ‘Sustainable Fish’, 12 J. OF AGRARIAN 
CHANGE no. 2-3, at 300-315. Tzankova, supra note 17.  
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achievements of, and insights from, a similar set of NGO initiatives that 
have sought to reform environmentally problematic fishery practices by 
leveraging the buyer power, supply chain influence, and private regulatory 
authority of large retailers in the food markets of the global west.23 We do 
so with careful attention to the specifics of the meat supply chain, 
especially the organization of the industry and the power relationships 
among US retailers and upstream actors in the meat supply chain. As 
noted, we draw on key insights from market-driven fishery reform efforts 
to evaluate the dynamics and potential of NGO efforts for market-driven, 
private regulation of antibiotic use in US agriculture.  
 The analysis presented in this article suggests that NGO efforts to 
mobilize and deploy the market power and private authority of retailers 
and other big buyers within the meat supply chain represent a promising 
approach to eliminating the problematic and persistent overuse of 
antibiotics in US animal agriculture. It further suggests that this is the case 
even if NGO efforts at private, market-driven regulation fall short of 
reforming antibiotic overuse in US agriculture. That is, even if their 
immediate private regulatory objectives are unsuccessful, market-based 
regulation initiatives can still shift the politics of public regulation of 
antibiotics in ways that facilitate the long-elusive strengthening of 
government regulatory controls on antibiotics in agriculture.  
 More specifically, our analysis suggests that retailer targeting, on its 
own, may well fail to generate private regulatory pressure sufficient to 
reform agricultural antibiotic use. That is, we anticipate that even if 
targeted retailers comply with NGO demands for exerting supply chain 
pressure, which many targeted retailers are quite likely to do, they may be 
unable to trigger antibiotic use reform by acting through the market alone. 
Still, we show how NGO-cornered retailers can nonetheless become 
significant contributors to agricultural antibiotics reform if they adapt their 
responses to NGO pressure by combining the private regulatory authority 
they have as big buyers with the political and public policy leverage they 
have as large corporate actors. Creating a public expectation for retailer 
exercise of market power and private regulatory authority on the 
antibiotics issue may thus prove a critical component of a broader, multi-
front antibiotics reform strategy. Putting branded and closely competing 
retailers in the spotlight, creating a risk of reputational and brand damage 
for each of the NGO-targeted retailers, can motivate these retailers to use 
all their resources—private regulatory authority and public regulation 
                                                 
23. Tzankova, supra note 17.  
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influence alike—to advance the NGO reform agenda and avoid 
reputational damage.   
 The next section, Part II, introduces the longstanding problem of 
antibiotic overuse in US agriculture and highlights the challenges of 
addressing this problem through the public regulatory process. This 
background is important to underscore why consumer and health 
advocates have more recently turned to private, market-driven regulation. 
Part III discusses why retailer targeting, particularly a sector-wide 
targeting of all large retailers within a relevant national retail market, is a 
promising strategy for private, market-driven regulation. Part IV turns to 
retailer-focused NGO initiatives for market-driven regulation of fishing 
and fishery practices. The experience from these initiatives offers an 
important set of empirically-grounded insights on the potential and limits 
of retailer targeting as a regulatory and reform strategy. Part V applies 
these insights to the antibiotics case: it considers if and how retailer 
cooperation with NGO demands to flex market power and supply chain 
muscle can bring the desired reduction in antibiotic use in the US. Part VI 
concludes by reflecting on both the direct and indirect potential of retailer 
targeting, as a form of market-driven regulation, to reduce agricultural 
antibiotic use in the US.  
II. ANTIBIOTIC USE IN US AGRICULTURE: THE RATIONALE FOR PRIVATE, 
MARKET-BASED REGULATION 
 The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and its 
international counterparts identify antibiotic resistance as one of the most 
serious public health threats.24 Over two million Americans each year 
become seriously infected with antibiotic resistant bacteria and twenty-
three thousand die from the infections. Many more die from infection-
related complications of other health conditions.25 In its latest report on the 
devastation of antibiotic resistance and the urgent need for solutions, CDC 
unambiguously points to antibiotic overuse and misuse as the cause of this 
problem and holds up the judicious and sparing use of antibiotics as the 
most promising solution to the unacceptably high human toll of overuse. 
In CDC’s own words: 
 Up to half of antibiotic use in humans and much of antibiotic use 
in animals is unnecessary and inappropriate and makes everyone less 
                                                 
24. Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 2013, CDC 11-13 (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf. Antimicrobial Resistance At The G8 
Summit, GLOBAL JOURNAL, http://theglobaljournal.net/photo/view/1789/ (last visited Spring 2015).   
25. CDC, supra note 24.  
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safe. Stopping even some of the inappropriate and unnecessary use 
of antibiotics in people and animals would help greatly in slowing 
down the spread of resistant bacteria.26 
A. The use of antibiotics in US animal agriculture 
 The CDC is also emphatic that given the human health risks, 
antibiotics should only be used in livestock production to treat infectious 
disease and should only be used under strict veterinary oversight.27 Yet 
oversight of antibiotic use in US agriculture is critically lacking.28 Even 
the amount of antibiotics used in animal agriculture in the United States is 
disputed because there are no mandatory reporting requirements for much 
of the problematic sub-therapeutic use.29 The Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) calculates that 80 percent of all antibiotics sold in the US 
are used in food animals,30 with only a small portion of that amount used 
for the treatment of sick animals. The meat industry, through its trade 
associations and veterinary spokespeople, disputes these figures.31 In 
2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reported that the 
industry used twenty-nine million pounds of antibiotics in 2009.32 Much 
of this use is not to treat illness, (therapeutic use) but to prevent illness and 
speed growth (sub-therapeutic use); the latter includes classes of 
                                                 
26. CDC, supra note 24, at 31.  
27. See Antibiotic Resistance Threats Report and Foodborne Germs, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/narms/resources/threats.html (last visited Spring 2015).  
28. Playing Chicken with Antibiotics, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
http://www.nrdc.org/food/saving-antibiotics/antibiotic-feed-fda-documents.asp (last revised Jan. 27, 
2014).  
29. See Mary McKenna, NEWS BREAK: FDA estimates us livestock get 29 million pounds of 
antibiotics per year, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.wired.com/2010/12/news-break-fda-estimate-
us-livestock-get-29-million-pounds-of-antibiotics-per-year/. Tom Philpott, The FDA finally reveals 
how many antibiotics factory farms use — and it's a shitload, GRIST (Dec. 11, 2010), 
http://grist.org/article/food-2010-12-10-fda-reveals-amount-of-antibiotic-use-on-factory-farms/. Dr. 
Apley comments on the 80 percent number, NATIONAL CATTLEMEN’S BEEF ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.beefusa.org/videos.aspx?videoid=XKRO7QpPdLk (last visited Spring 2015). Saptoka et 
al, supra note 2.   
30. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, supra note 28. Lydia Zuraw, CDC Acknowledges 
Role of Farms in Antibiotic Resistance, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/09/drug-resistant-infections/#.VO4oFLDF_Iw. See also 
Summary Report on Antimicrobials Sold or Distributed for Use in Food-Producing Animals, FDA 
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/AnimalDrugUser 
FeeActADUFA/UCM338170.pdf.   
31. Antibiotic Use in Livestock Production: Ensuring Meat Safety, AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, 
https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/56994  
(last visited Spring 2015). See also The Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act, 
CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1150/text 
(last visited Spring 2015). 
32. Philpott, supra note 29.  
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antibiotics critical for human medicine, such as tetracyclines, penicillins, 
and sulphonamides. Prophylactic and growth promoting uses of antibiotics 
often overlap, so it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The industry 
has, therefore, tried to reframe its antibiotic use as primarily prophylactic 
(i.e., helping animals stay healthy), without actually changing its 
antibiotics use practices.33 
 Sub-therapeutic doses of antibiotics have been routine in US animal 
agriculture since the 1960s. Much of current US animal production is 
dependent on antibiotics, especially pork and beef production.34 
Discovered accidentally in the late 1940s, the growth-promoting effect of 
low-dose antibiotics routinely administered in animal feed has been 
widely utilized to improve the productivity and economic returns of 
animal farming.35 The popularity of sub-therapeutic antibiotic use in 
agriculture is further increased by the fact that such low dose use has 
proven beneficial in controlling a number of chronic diseases typical for 
intensively-reared animals living under the stress of confinement 
conditions.36 Intensive agriculture operations across Western countries use 
antibiotics for animal growth promotion, but the range of antibiotics 
registered for growth-promoting use is widest in the United States.37  
B. The problem with agricultural overuse of antibiotics 
 The biggest concern raised by the agricultural overuse of antibiotics 
is the fact that such overuse creates antibiotic resistance in animal and 
human pathogens.38 Rapidly evolving animal pathogens continuously 
exposed to antibiotics are quick to develop antibiotic resistance, which is 
then transmitted to human pathogens, making a number of human 
                                                 
33. Interview: Michael Pollan, FRONTLINE: MODERN MEAT, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages 
/frontline/shows/meat/interviews/pollan.html (last visited Spring 2015).  The FDA is cracking down 
on antibiotics on farms. Here’s you should know, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2013, http://www.washin 
gtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/14/the-fda-is-cracking-down-on-antibiotics-at-farms-
heres-what-you-should-know/.   
34. “What’s in the beef?” Survey Results, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER (July 2, 
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85 JOURNAL OF APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY no. 5, at 531-541 (1997).  
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infections traditionally treated through antibiotics difficult to cure and 
control.  
 The continued rise in overuse-driven antibiotic resistance has become 
one of the top public health concerns internationally. Concern over the rise 
and spread of antibiotic resistance is heightened by the fact that 
development of new and more powerful classes of antibiotics is a slow and 
difficult process, so the rise of bacterial resistance to the currently 
available classes of antibiotics has outpaced our ability to develop new 
ones. The problems presented by growth in bacterial drug resistance and 
decreasing antibiotic effectiveness are significant enough to have taken 
center-stage at a recent G8 summit. A number of national health and 
science ministers used the 2013 G8 summit to raise awareness of the 
antibiotic resistance issue and make an urgent and very public call for 
rapid and rigorous policy and regulatory action to keep antibiotics working 
by ensuring their responsible use.39  
 The US agriculture industry, however, continues to deny the public 
health hazards associated with its current practice of widespread sub-
therapeutic use of antibiotics on livestock.40 Instead of heeding the 
increasingly urgent calls for responsible and sparing use of antibiotics, the 
US agriculture industry has proceeded to defend its practices as necessary 
and therapeutic, putting the blame for antibiotic resistance on improper 
and excessive human use.41  
                                                 
39. Maryn McKenna, G8 meeting begins: ag antibiotics on the agenda?, WIRED (June 17, 2013), 
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THE BURRILL REPORT (June 13, 2013), http://www.burrillreport.com/article-g8_science_ministe 
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s&year=2012&file=nr0613.html. See also Beth Mole, MRSA: Farming up trouble: Microbiologists 
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to antibiotic resistance?, NATIONAL CATTLEMEN’S BEEF ASSOCIATION, 
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C. Public policy and regulatory attempts to control agricultural overuse 
of antibiotics 
 Public health concerns over the effects of sub-therapeutic animal uses 
of antibiotics first emerged in the U.S. in the 1970s.42 Prompted by these 
concerns and the underlying data, the FDA itself proposed to restrict 
agricultural uses of human antibiotics. The FDA’s early and prescient 
regulatory effort was ultimately hindered by Congress: yielding to 
pressure from the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries, Congress 
declared that the FDA needed more data to justify its proposed regulatory 
restrictions on agricultural use of antibiotics.43  
 In spite of mounting scientific evidence and growing international 
concern about the public health hazards caused by antibiotic overuse,44 the 
United States has so far failed to curb such overuse through public policy 
and regulation.45 Struggling against the chilling effect of industry 
resistance through lobbying and litigation, the FDA has made several 
significant attempts to control sub-therapeutic agricultural use of 
antibiotics. None has produced binding and comprehensive restrictions on 
the sub-therapeutic agricultural use of antibiotics, including antibiotics 
important in human medicine.46 Facing ongoing industry opposition to 
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45. Laura Koontz, Staffer for Representative Louise Slaughter, Personal communication, 
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 46. Brent F. Kim et al., supra note 45, at 8-9. See also Guidance to Industry # 209, supra note 
7. See also Phasing Out Certain Antibiotic Use in Farm Animals, FDA (Dec. 11, 2013), 
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in Animal Feed, FDA LAW BLOG (Jul. 28, 2014), 
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binding and comprehensive agricultural antibiotic regulation,47 as well as 
growing NGO pressure in favor of such regulation,48 the FDA most 
recently attempted to control the industry by issuing voluntary industry 
guidance. In this voluntary guidance, the FDA urged the pharmaceutical 
industry to refrain from marketing certain classes of antibiotics, 
particularly those important in human medicine, to the agriculture 
industry; it also emphasized the importance of self-restraint by agricultural 
producers when using antibiotics on livestock.49 Unfortunately, this is the 
best that the politically beleaguered and litigation-targeted FDA has been 
able to manage. Perhaps unsurprising given the history and regulatory 
politics of this issue, the voluntary guidance approach to regulating 
agricultural use of antibiotics has failed to produce any appreciable change 
in problematic patterns of sub-therapeutic use.  
 An apparently promising litigation-based approach has so far failed 
as well: in 2012, the NRDC won a lawsuit against the FDA, getting a 
federal court to compel the agency to begin withdrawing approvals for all 
sub-therapeutic uses of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed. The 
federal court decision was reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit a mere 
two years later, however.50  
 Finally, legislative efforts have fared equally poorly. Bills attempting 
to regulate the sub-therapeutic animal use of antibiotic classes that are 
important in human medicine—bills such as the Preservation of 
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Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act (PAMTA)—have been repeatedly 
introduced in Congress and have repeatedly failed.51  
D. The turn to private, market-based regulation of antibiotics use in ag-
riculture 
 Government and civil society efforts for public policy and regulatory 
reform of agricultural antibiotic use are still very much underway, the 
currently overwhelming political odds against them notwithstanding.52 In 
the face of such strong political resistance, reform advocates, including the 
most vehement and longest-standing Congressional champions of 
tightening public regulation, are also beginning to look to the market, 
supply chains, and the private regulatory authority of powerful large 
buyers within these supply chains for some private regulatory solutions to 
the public health problems presented by excessive agricultural use of 
medically important antibiotics. Quite notably, Representative Louise 
Slaughter, the leader of the ongoing legislative efforts to reform 
agricultural use of antibiotics, has herself recently focused her energies on 
working through the market—on mobilizing the buying power and private 
regulatory authority of large market actors within the meat supply chain, 
and on getting these actors to use their power and authority to stop the sub-
therapeutic use of antibiotics in US livestock production. In 2012, 
Representative Slaughter took the unusual step of sending a highly 
publicized open letter to food retailers and fast food companies, 
demanding that these companies state whether and how they are using 
their significant market power to stop the dangerous overuse of antibiotics 
by the livestock producers who supply their meat.53 More recently, 
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Representative Slaughter has begun approaching individual companies 
directly, publicly asking McDonalds to switch to antibiotic-free beef.54  
 In sum, having tried all the available public policy and regulatory 
venues, civil society and even government officials are turning to the 
market as a logical next arena for pursuing regulatory and management 
reform. 
III. THE PROMISE AND POTENTIAL OF RETAILER TARGETING AS AN NGO 
STRATEGY FOR MARKET-BASED ANTIBIOTICS REGULATION 
 Market concentration and technology-enabled consolidation of 
retailer control over the product chain have made large grocery retailers 
one of the most powerful actors in the global food system.55 
A. The market power and private authority of large retailers 
 In the highly concentrated US grocery retail market, the four largest 
retailers (WalMart, Kroger, Costco, with Safeway and Target 
continuously vying for 4th place) control close to 50 percent of the national 
market. The thirteen largest retailers targeted by the Consumers Union 
“Meat without Drugs” campaign control more than 80 percent of the 
national grocery market.56 Grocery retail market concentration can reach 
80 percent on the regional level, meaning that the top four retailers in a 
number of US regions get up to 80 percent of all the consumer grocery 
dollars spent in that region.57 This type of market concentration gives large 
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CONSUMERIST (May 19, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/05/19/rep-slaughter-asks-mcdonalds-to-
switch-to-antibiotic-free-beef/. Press Release, Congresswoman Slaughter Says McDonald's 
Announcement on Antibiotics is "Encouraging," Shows Companies Respond When Public Demands 
Change (Mar. 4, 2015), available at http://www.louise.house.gov/press-releases/congresswoman-
slaughter-says-mcdonalds-announcement-on-antibiotics-is-encouraging-shows-companies-respond-
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retailers considerable, oligopsonistic power over upstream actors in the 
agri-food supply chain, including agricultural food producers and food 
processors, because both producers and processors are dependent on 
retailers to get products to market.58 
 A new and increasingly apparent dimension of this oligopsonistic 
power is the capacity of such retailers to set and enforce product or process 
requirements, rules, and standards on upstream actors within their supply 
chain.59 Prompted by the desire to enhance consumer confidence in the 
aftermath of numerous food crises experienced in recent decades, many 
retailers have developed private rules and standards focused on food safety 
and quality.60 In addition to these product and process rules and standards, 
retailers or supermarket organizations have also generated some of their 
own quality assurance and safety schemes.61 In sum, retailers are using 
their buying power and associated private authority to require that 
suppliers and producers comply with not only safety and quality assurance 
standards, but also labor and environmental standards and practices.62  
 Reform-minded NGOs who seek to improve the social and 
environmental performance of agriculture and the food industry more 
broadly are understandably interested in mobilizing the newly asserted 
regulatory authority of large retailers and using it to change ecologically 
and/or socially problematic practices in agriculture and food production.63 
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B. Retailer vulnerability to NGO pressure 
 What ultimately gives reform-minded NGOs the ability to muster 
retailer market power and private regulatory authority in the service of 
social and environmental objectives is the fact that large retailers are quite 
vulnerable to NGO pressure. Using their position of expertise and moral 
authority, NGOs are in a position to damage a retailer’s brand and 
undermine a retailer’s competitive position by publicizing their sourcing 
practices, and arguing that any sourcing from environmentally destructive 
or labor-abusive agricultural and food producers makes retailers complicit 
in environmental destruction and labor exploitation.64 It is the same market 
concentration that gives retailers their market power that makes them 
vulnerable. Most large retailers operating in the highly competitive 
environment of the concentrated grocery retail market can ill afford the 
competitive and financial risks associated with NGO-inflicted reputational 
damage.65  
 This is because market concentration and the oligopolistic structure 
of the grocery retail market has not made the business environment any 
less competitive.66 Grocery retail is a mature market whose growth is 
generally tied to growth in population. Given their thin operating margins, 
large retailers need a large number of customers to remain profitable,67 
meaning that they are constantly competing for the same finite and fairly 
static pool of grocery buyers and purchases. Brand development and 
differentiation through quality, variety, and convenience are the new core 
elements of staying competitive.68 Large grocery retailers are now brands 
in their own right, and reputation in the realm of social and environmental 
responsibility is an important component of differentiation and brand 
building.69 This is precisely the reputation—and the part of the retailer’s 
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brand image—that NGOs are in a position to damage when a retailer 
refuses to use its market power in the public interest, or otherwise chooses 
to defy NGO demands.70  
 Research has demonstrated that at least two-thirds of consumers in 
the global West form impressions of a company based on its ethics, 
environmental impact, and social responsibility,71 and that damage to one 
dimension of the brand has the potential to damage a company’s overall 
reputation. NGO-targeted retailers thus have every reason to avoid the 
reputational risks of defying NGO demands and expectations. Particularly 
because the NGOs that target retailers as part of a broader strategy for 
market-driven regulation are highly skilled at translating their campaign 
goals and expectations into a much broader set of consumer, citizen, and 
societal expectations regarding retailer behavior and use of market power 
and supply chain leverage.  
 In sum, the same consolidation of the grocery retail market that has 
given retailers their market power has also made them vulnerable to the 
reputational consequences of negative interactions with NGOs. Perhaps 
paradoxically, the more retailers invest in building a green reputation, the 
more vulnerable they become to future NGO attacks threatening such 
reputation.72 A number of retailers have invested in building a green 
reputation, and have already worked to bolster and maintain such 
reputations by meeting various NGO demands.73 Such retailers should be 
more likely to heed new NGO demands to make an earnest effort to use 
their market power and private authority in ways that advance NGO 
environmental and social reform objectives.    
 Indeed, corporate targeting in general, and the targeting of large, 
branded retailers in particular, has been one of the most important strategic 
innovations by NGOs and civil society actors engaged in advocating for 
the public interest. The value and anticipated transformative potential of 
this innovation was captured by a Greenpeace activist, who likened it to 
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“discovering gunpowder for environmentalists.”74 Recognizing the 
difficulty of sending market and regulatory signals by changing the buying 
habits of large numbers of individual consumers, many NGOs have shifted 
their emphasis to changing the sourcing practices of large and market-
powerful food buyers, buyers such as large grocery retailers who have the 
authority and capacity to dictate production practices and conditions to 
their suppliers and producers. Consumers are now informed citizen-
consumers who hold retailers responsible for their actions, especially their 
use of market power to fix social and environmental problems in food 
production.  
 The brand vulnerability and reputational sensitivity of retailers are 
what ultimately give NGOs the leverage to elicit retailer cooperation.75 
Acting from a position of social legitimacy and moral authority, NGOs 
have managed to position themselves as a credible threat to reputationally 
sensitive companies who defy their demands.76 The proliferation of tools 
for corporate reputation management in the face of NGO threats, such as 
the Brand Vulnerability Index, is but one prominent indicator of the 
strength of NGO leverage. It is also an indicator of the promise of 
corporate targeting as a market-based strategy that uses supply chains to 
mobilize private regulatory authority in the service of social and 
environmental reform.77 
C. The promise of retailer targeting as a strategy for market-driven anti-
biotics reform 
 Several elements of the “Meat without Drugs” campaign suggest that 
it has particularly high transformative promise. First, its timing is quite 
auspicious: by the time retailers faced CU demands to phase out meat 
raised with sub-therapeutic antibiotics, many of them had already invested 
in building a “green” reputation.78 They did so to differentiate themselves 
and be more competitive,79 yet their success at building a green reputation 
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is what makes them more vulnerable to reputational damage on “green” 
issues, and what ultimately makes them more susceptible to NGO pressure 
on the issue of antibiotics in meat production. If a “green” retailer fails to 
engage and work with NGOs on a “green” issue like antibiotics, NGOs 
like CU and its partners are perfectly positioned to publicize the 
contradiction between the retailer’s green image and its deficient action on 
the antibiotics issue. That is, NGOs are perfectly positioned to jeopardize 
a carefully built corporate reputation by exposing hypocrisy and hinting at 
“greenwash.”80  
 There is some evidence that Trader Joe’s has already experienced 
some of this reputational pain. It was the first retail target singled out for 
broad publicity by the CU campaign due to its large share of own-brand 
products, which is presumed to give Trader Joe’s a lot of control over the 
practices of suppliers making these products.81 Trader Joe’s has seen its 
loyal customers surprised and disappointed by the revelation that the 
retailer was not already selling only antibiotic-free meat.82  
 Another advantage for the CU-led antibiotics campaign is that 
previous retailer-focused efforts at market-based governance, such as 
those of the sustainable seafood movement, old-growth coalition, and fair-
labor organizations before it,83 had gone a long way towards establishing 
consumer expectations for socially and environmentally responsible 
retailer behavior. Those previous efforts focused on convincing people 
that they were not just consumers, but citizen consumers who should view 
a retailer’s market power as a source of responsibility to advance the social 
good. In other words, those campaigns went a long way in creating the 
consumer and societal expectation that retailers would lead rather than 
simply follow consumer trends or messages towards sustainability, all 
while meeting the more traditional customer demands and expectations 
about choice, variety, and pricing.84 The leverage of CU’s “Meat Without 
Drugs” campaign is only increased by the fact that meat is a center-plate 
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item, and a major weekly draw of customers for most of the targeted large 
retailers.85 
 A third reason that the retailer-focused “Meat without Drugs” 
campaign should be particularly effective is the fact that agricultural 
antibiotic use affects human health, and consumers have already come to 
hold retailers responsible for health and safety aspects of the food they 
sell. Campaign NGOs are well positioned to help consumers see the 
connection between their own health concerns and the larger public health 
concerns related to antibiotic overuse in agriculture. A notable 55 percent 
of the consumers who purchased natural or organic meat in the US in 2013 
cite positive long-term health effects for themselves as the rationale for 
such purchase. Of those consumers who purchased natural and organic 
meat, 46 percent said that those meats are free of substances they want to 
avoid.86 At the same time, 69 percent of all consumers87 say that price 
prohibits them from buying natural/organic meat. Enlisting the indignation 
and pressure of these consumers by reminding them that it is the retailer’s 
job to protect them from the public health risks can be a powerful tool in 
the hands of competent, strategic NGOs, such as CU, NRDC, and the 
public health NGOs supporting their efforts.  
 A fourth factor spelling the promise of current NGO initiatives for 
market-driven regulation of antibiotics in agriculture is the structure of 
these initiatives. The campaign is positioned to target the entire grocery 
retail sector and put pressure on all of the largest retailers, which represent 
the vast majority of the US grocery retail market. In other words, it is 
positioned to become one of the most encompassing and forceful among 
current market-based environmental reform efforts.  
 To accomplish the broader environmental and social goals behind 
their market-based governance efforts, NGOs need action by a critical 
mass of retailers simultaneously pressing suppliers to change 
environmentally and socially problematic practices in food production. 
But market-driven governance initiatives that target all large retailers in a 
national market have important strategic benefits as well: NGOs can 
compare and contrast retailer performance, periodically singling out a 
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retailer for intensive pressure and publicity. This approach is especially 
suited to changing the market in the ways desired by NGOs because it uses 
the structure of the market and retail competition to create brinkmanship 
and further pit already competing retailers against each other in terms of 
their sustainable sourcing and sustainability performance.88 Retailer 
compliance with NGO demands and the reputational consequences of such 
compliance (or non-compliance) then become another explicit element in 
market competition among retailers. When a few of the targeted retailers 
meet NGO demands, thus presumably demonstrating the practical 
feasibility and reasonableness of such demands, they are also helping to 
increase pressure on the rest. This increases the sense of vulnerability 
among the remaining targeted retailers who look especially bad if they fail 
to act when competitors have.  
 In sum, the growing market power, supply chain leverage and private 
regulatory authority of retailers, along with retailer vulnerability to 
reputational damage, makes NGO targeting of large food retailers 
particularly promising as a strategy for mobilizing and deploying market-
driven regulatory pressure on the use of antibiotics in U.S. agriculture. The 
specific promise of the CU “Meat without Drugs” campaign is further 
amplified by the campaign’s structure and timing: it comes at a time when 
retailers are particularly conscious and protective of their laboriously built 
green reputations, while consumers, conditioned by a number of previous 
retailer-focused NGO initiatives for market-driven environmental reform, 
are particularly attentive to retailer behavior and the ways retailers choose 
to use their market power.  
IV. THE DYNAMICS AND REGULATORY OUTCOMES OF RETAILER 
TARGETING: INSIGHTS FROM MARKET-DRIVEN FISHERY REFORM 
INITIATIVES  
 When confronted by forceful, sustained, and well-designed NGO 
initiatives, many targeted retailers have strong incentives to cooperate. 
However, the actual ability of retailers to solve societal problems through 
the exercise of private authority varies across issues and situations.89 The 
nature and structure of relevant supply chains, particularly the power 
relationships among nodes in the chains, affect the change-making 
capacity of even the most cooperative set of retailers.90  
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 The literature on corporate power and private regulation offers a 
variety of examples of branded corporate actors, retail brands, and grocery 
retailers in particular, that successfully used their buying power, under 
NGO pressure, to change on-the-ground labor and environmental practices 
in apparel and food production.91 But, the literature also offers examples 
where NGO-targeted large retailers have been unable to change 
problematic production practices by acting through the market alone, 
despite retailers’ desire to do so.92 
A. The limits of market-driven private regulation as revealed in the fish-
eries context 
 NGO-led efforts for fisheries reform provide a compelling example 
of how adaptive and effective market-based regulation initiatives may well 
succeed in changing the market for seafood (by creating a massive new 
demand for sustainably caught fish in the seafood marketplace), yet still 
fall short of generating the intended improvements in actual fishing and 
fishery management practices.93  
 In the case of NGO initiatives for market-driven reform of fishing 
and fishery management practices, large US retailers—key market actors 
in the seafood supply chain—have faced NGO demands very similar to 
those made of them by the NGOs seeking market-driven reform of 
antibiotic use practices in agriculture. Marine conservation NGOs expect 
and publicly urge retailers to use their buying power to press for reform 
and/or elimination of ecologically problematic fishing and fishery 
resource use and management practices. The majority of NGO-targeted 
Western retailers, including those in the U.S., have made serious and 
public commitments to sustainable seafood sourcing, thus effectively 
committing to use their market power, supply chain leverage, and private 
regulatory authority for changing ecologically problematic practices in the 
fisheries that supply their seafood. As part of their sustainable seafood 
commitment, retailers have worked to understand the environmental 
impacts and sustainability status of the seafood they sell. They have 
eliminated some of the most problematic fish species from their seafood 
inventory and imposed a new set of product specifications on their 
processor and wholesaler suppliers. Retailers are increasingly pressing 
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their suppliers to deliver only seafood produced in ecologically 
appropriate manner.94  
 Even after such flexing of market power and private regulatory 
authority, most seafood retailers have been unable to transition to a fully 
or even mostly sustainable seafood supply.95 This is because the supply of 
sustainable seafood available on the global and US markets remains 
seriously constrained by the still limited prevalence of sustainable fishery 
practices. In other words, many of the fishing industry actors whose 
ecologically problematic practices are the ultimate target of the NGO 
retailer-focused campaigns are not changing such practices in response to 
retailer, wholesaler, and processor demands for sustainably caught fish 
from sustainably managed fisheries. Sustainable sources of supply are 
particularly scarce for some of the seafood species most popular with 
consumers—species such as shrimp and tuna—which means that large 
retailers are unable to make credible threats about ceasing to source these 
species from non-compliant producers. Without enough sustainable 
sources for popular seafood items, refusing to do business with 
unsustainable non-compliant producers would mean eliminating or greatly 
reducing the amounts of popular seafood on offer.96 However, most 
retailers are poorly positioned to make such dramatic gestures, given that 
they operate in a competitive context where even a temporary stockout of 
popular merchandise can send customers to better stocked retail 
competitors, possibly permanently.97 In that market environment, 
discontinuing the sale of ecologically problematic but popular seafood for 
which there is no sustainable replacement is too big of a competitive risk, 
one greater than the risk of reputational and brand damage from NGO 
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action against non-compliant retailers.98 Within the seafood supply chain, 
retailers have, in other words, simply lacked the leverage that comes with 
a ready set of alternative suppliers who are eager to meet retailer demands 
if the current suppliers will not.99  
 Retailers’ considerable motivation and effort to meet NGO demands 
and their overall position as oligopsonistic buyers in the broader food 
system have not been enough to demand upstream changes. Powerful as 
they are, they lack sufficient market power and private authority within 
the seafood supply chain itself. Reforming problematic fishery practices 
apparently cannot be done through the market alone.  
B. The unexpected broader potential of market-driven reform efforts 
 Limits on their direct effects and effectiveness notwithstanding, NGO 
initiatives in private market-driven fisheries regulation have significantly 
improved the prospects for attaining sustainable management and use of 
currently problematic fisheries. By creating “sustainable seafood” as a 
marketing category and convincing retailers in the global West to publicly 
commit to sustainable seafood sourcing, these NGOs have turned retailers 
and other big buyers100 into major, active stakeholders in fishery 
management and sustainable fishery practices. The serious and pervasive 
conservation problems that NGOs are working to solve, including 
overfishing, bycatch, and destructive fishing practices, have also become 
a serious business problem for retailers and other big seafood buyers 
struggling to meet sustainable sourcing commitments. The violation of 
these commitments threatens corporate reputations, brands, and 
competitiveness. Thus, the sustainability (or lack thereof) in fishery 
practices has become a business problem that big buyers in the seafood 
sector are newly motivated to solve. 
 Within this new strategic context—a context created by NGO efforts 
at private, market-driven fisheries regulation—marine conservation NGOs 
have the unprecedented opportunity to advance better fishery management 
and stronger marine conservation by mobilizing the political and policy 
influence of business stakeholders for seafood sustainability and using this 
influence to advance public regulatory reform in fishery management. 
NGOs, including a number of the NGOs whose market-focused work was 
instrumental in getting sustainable sourcing commitments from big 
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seafood buyers, appear to be seizing this new opportunity. With NGO 
urging, guidance, and rewards, retailers and the big seafood buyers and 
processors who have contracts to supply those retailers are beginning to 
find themselves working, directly or indirectly, to strengthen the public 
regulatory government of problematic source fisheries (i.e., working to 
attain the kind of regulatory government that can ensure a sustainable 
seafood supply by reforming ecologically problematic fishery resource use 
and management).101 
 In light of difficulties with using market pressure to improve fisheries 
management, marine conservation NGOs have set a modified new agenda 
for seafood buyer engagement in fishery sustainability: they are urging 
seafood buyers to flex their political and policy muscle as well as their 
supply chain muscle in pursuit of improved fishing and fishery 
management practices in their source fisheries. As stated during an NGO 
panel at the annual industry-NGO sustainable seafood meeting: 
More and more businesses are taking steps towards sustainability. 
However . . . many forward-thinking companies are concerned that 
some steps that would be good for the environment and long-term 
sustainability may not be currently competitive. Engaging in advo-
cacy to reform fishery and aquaculture laws can be a powerful avenue 
to extend sustainability measures to the entire sector, ensuring that 
steps that would be good for the environment will be good for busi-
ness as well.102  
In sum, extensive recent experience from NGO initiatives in private, 
market-driven fisheries regulation suggests that well-designed and well-
run NGO initiatives for market-driven private regulation—initiatives that 
combine sector-wide appeal to retailers and other big buyers with a 
periodic singling out of individual food retail corporations for public 
scrutiny and pressure—can have significant regulatory and transformative 
potential, even if they do not work as originally planned.   
 Intriguingly, and perhaps unexpectedly, the NGO experience with 
private, market-driven fisheries regulation suggests that even if private 
regulatory initiatives fail to directly produce the desired improvements in 
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environmental and resource practices, they may still do so indirectly by 
creating important new business demand and support for improved 
government regulation of ecologically problematic environmental and 
resource practices. This gives NGOs an opportunity to mobilize and direct 
the political and policy influence of such new business stakeholders 
towards sustainability-focused public policy and regulatory change.  
V. RETAILER RESPONSES TO NGO ANTIBIOTICS-IN-MEAT DEMANDS: 
WHAT WE COULD EXPECT AND WHY  
 NGO experience with efforts to use the market to reform fisheries 
shows that the relative success of harnessing buying power to change the 
environmental practices of food producers depends on the structure of the 
relevant markets, the organization of the relevant supply chains, and, 
particularly, the relative power of big corporate buyers within these supply 
chains.  
 What, then, are the prospects of private, market-based governance of 
antibiotic use in US agriculture? What is the likelihood that large retailers, 
under pressure from NGOs, will stop the sub-therapeutic use of antibiotics 
in US agriculture by exerting buyer power over upstream actors in the 
meat supply chain? How easy or difficult would it be for these retailers to 
make the NGO-demanded shift to sourcing and selling only meat produced 
without sub-therapeutic doses of antibiotics?  
A. The Regulatory Promise of Markets-Focused NGO Antibiotics Initia-
tives 
 In several respects, market-based NGO campaigns related to 
antibiotics appear to have more regulatory and practical promise than their 
fisheries counterparts. First, the changes in agricultural practice sought by 
consumer and medical NGOs should be easier and more straightforward 
to implement than the scientifically complex task of managing naturally 
fluctuating fish stocks to avoid overfishing. A comprehensive agricultural 
transition away from sub-therapeutic antibiotics would involve certain 
changes to the protocols and daily routines of the currently dominant 
intensive animal farming operations and likely an increased cost of 
production, at least in the short term.103 This kind of technical and practical 
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transition, however, has already succeeded in agricultural contexts similar 
to the US one, such as Denmark, where government regulation has driven 
a phase-out of sub-therapeutic antibiotic use from animal production with 
no appreciable long-term impacts on farming operations and meat costs.104 
 Second, the relevant meat supply chains are not as lengthy, complex, 
and geographically dispersed as the global seafood supply chains. Much 
of the meat sold and consumed in the U.S. is produced and processed in 
the U.S.,105 and it is U.S. agriculture’s use of antibiotics that NGO market 
initiatives aim to reform. 
 A third factor suggesting the potential success of NGO efforts to 
affect market-driven regulation of antibiotics is the fact that when the 
NGO market campaigns began, most of the targeted retailers were already 
sourcing and selling a number of antibiotic-free meats in response to 
consumer demand and willingness to pay a premium for various types of 
“sustainable” meats. Sustainable meat sales (which can be broadly defined 
to include natural, organic, grass-fed, free-range, and other categories) 
have continued to grow in market share.106 Most of the meat across this 
                                                 
2014), www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014-july/antibiotics-used-forgrowth-promotion-have-a-
small-positive-effect-on-hog-farm-productivity.aspx#. U9rL3GOwKGx.  
104. Impacts of Antimicrobial Growth Promoter Termination in Denmark, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION (Nov. 2002), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/68357/1/WHO_CDS_CPE_ 
ZFK_2003.1.pdf?ua=1.  
105. Poultry & Eggs: Overview, United States Department of Agriculture: Economic Research 
Service, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/poultry-eggs.aspx (last updated Nov. 7, 
2012). Hog & Pork: Overview, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/hogs-pork.aspx (last updated 
Jun. 27, 2014). Cattle & Beef: Overview, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/cattle-beef.aspx (last updated 
May 26, 2012). As one of the largest meat producers in the world, the US is also a significant exporter 
of meat. See, e.g., Kenneth Mathews & Mildrey Haley, Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook, UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE (Feb. 17, 2015), available 
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1783484/ldpm248.pdf. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1375: 
FISHERIES – COMMERCIAL CATCH BY COUNTRY: 1990 TO 2008 (2012), available at 
https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1377.pdf. Leading Markets for U.S. Beef 
and Veal, NATIONAL CATTLEMEN, http://www.beefusa.org/CMDocs/BeefUS 
A/Resources/Statistics/November/leading%20markets.pdf (last visited Spring 2015).  
106. See, e.g., Bill Greer & Janet Riley, New Consumer Research Unveiled at the Annual Meat 
Conference: Conventional Supermarkets Wield the Power of Meat Sales to Compete; Demand for 
Natural and Organic Meat Increasing, FMI (Feb 20, 2007), http://www.fmi.org/news-room/news-
archive/view/2007/02/20/new-consumer-research-unveiled-at-the-annual-meat-conference-
conventional-supermarkets-wield-the-power-of-meat-sales-to-compete-demand-for-natural-and-
organic-meat-increasing. Purchasing Behavior in the Meat Department Reaching New Balance, FMI 
(Feb 22, 2011), http://www.fmi.org/news-room/latest-news/view/2011/02/22/purchasing-behavior-
in-the-meat-department-reaching-new-balance. 2012 Power of Meat Executive Summary, AMI & FMI 
3 (2012), http://www.fmi.org/docs/complimentary-research/2012-power-of-meat-exec-summary-
final.pdf?sfv rsn=2. The Power of Meat 2015, supra note 85.   
2015] Surf-n-Turf, but the Sustainable Kind? 331 
 
category comes from animals raised without the sub-therapeutic use of 
antibiotics.107  
 Further, a large percentage of consumers go to large grocery 
retailers—the NGO-targeted retailers—for their sustainable meat 
purchases. Traditional supermarkets, like Safeway, Kroger, and Stop-and-
Shop, are the primary source of organic meat purchases for 50 percent of 
organic-buying consumers. Supercenters and warehouse clubs like 
Walmart and Costco are the primary source of organic meat purchases for 
an additional 22 percent of consumers.108 
 Whole Foods is the only large retailer that exclusively sells 
antibiotic-free meat from animals raised in accordance with a minimum 
animal welfare standard (or higher) typically at a considerable price 
premium. Whole Foods’ sales of sustainable meat (along with those of 
small and independent grocers) contribute to the viability of its supplier 
farms, which often have higher costs associated with their more humane 
and environmentally-attuned production methods.109 
 Practically all of the NGO-targeted large retailers, however, offer a 
wide array of antibiotic-free and antibiotic-light alternatives to 
conventional meat, sold under both manufacturer and store brands, 
spanning several sustainable meat categories, such as natural, organic, and 
grass-fed.110 Introduced in 2011, Safeway’s “Open Nature” store brand 
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features beef, poultry, and pork products from animals raised with no sub-
therapeutic use of antibiotics.111 Kroger’s “Simple Truth” private label 
offers similar attributes, as does Ahold’s “Nature’s Promise.” These 
“better meat” sales by mainstream retailers are helping generate 
environmental and animal welfare improvements, even if arguably 
marginal ones,112 in the conventional meat industry.113  
 Indeed, it is this capacity for market-driven transformation that NGO 
retailer targeting is intended to mobilize. NGOs view the market-driven 
transformation of problematic antibiotic use practices as being within the 
power of targeted large retailers.114 
B. Retailer responses to the demands of markets-focused NGOs 
 Similar to the fisheries context, however, we can expect retailers to 
have trouble shifting entirely to antibiotic-free meats as long as there is 
limited US supply of such meats—i.e., as long as producers continue their 
unwillingness to shift away from sub-therapeutic uses.115 The question, 
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BEEF, http://www.countrynaturalbeef.com/where-to-buy.html (last visited spring 2015).  
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D’Silva eds., 2006).  
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humane slaughter became widespread in the US thanks to its requirements. See, e.g., Grandin, supra 
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comm. 
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then, is how retailers can persuade their upstream suppliers—and 
particularly those most responsible for production decisions—to make that 
shift. Retailers either have to be able to offer sufficient price incentives or 
they need to have enough market power to force upstream supply chain 
actors to make changes even without price increases. Neither of these 
scenarios seems likely, however.  
 First, the use of price premiums to expand the US production and 
supply of antibiotic-light meat does not seem viable for most of the 
targeted retailers because most would not be able to pass such premiums 
onto their customers. Raising meat prices is competitively too risky for 
most any individual retailer,116 unless the retailer could be sure that their 
relevant regional competitors would do the same. No such assurances are 
possible or forthcoming in the current climate of the US grocery market.117 
 The latest consumer research points to pervasive, recession-driven 
frugality among many grocery shoppers, suggesting that cost is the largest 
concern for many consumers, and that recession-driven frugality in 
grocery purchasing habits is poised to remain the new norm for many 
consumers.118 For meat in particular, the most recent annual surveys 
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conducted by the American Meat Institute (AMI) and the Food Marketing 
Institute (FMI) find that before shopping for meat and poultry, 45 percent 
of consumers regularly compare meat and poultry prices across stores, 
while another 31 percent of consumers engage in such cross-store meat 
price comparisons some of the time.119 The same surveys find 86 percent 
of consumers comparing prices within the meat department once they are 
in the store, and a number of consumers substituting kinds or cuts of meat 
as a way to control their meat spending.120 60 percent of the surveyed meat 
consumers were found to use a variety of additional money-saving 
strategies, such as the use of meat-stretching meal types like pastas and 
casseroles and reliance on sales and promotions.121 
 Retailers who are able to pass the higher costs of antibiotic-free or 
other sustainable meat to their customers have a different customer base 
than the mainstream retailer—a customer base both willing and able to 
pay often significant price premiums for higher sustainability (and health) 
attributes of meat and other products.  
 Given the remarkably small profit margins in traditional grocery 
retail, however,122 and given the importance of meat as a grocery retail 
category, retailers like Safeway, Kroger, HEB, and Ahold,123 where the 
majority of US grocery consumers buy most of their meat for at-home 
consumption,124 cannot absorb the cost of price premiums they would have 
to pay suppliers to abandon sub-therapeutic antibiotic use. It would 
certainly be unrealistic to expect retailers like HEB, for which beef is the 
largest retail category and worth $700 million in annual sales, to meet 
NGO demands by absorbing the costs of such premiums.125 
 Ultimately, however, it is precisely because large retailers have 
succeeded in forcing upstream actors to change their practices, and at those 
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actors’ own expense,126 that NGOs have chosen to focus on retailers to fix 
ecological or social problems with food production. If price incentives are 
beyond the reach of most targeted retailers, what of retailer capacity to 
force change in the antibiotic use practices of upstream actors responsible 
for production decisions?  
 The capacity of retailers to force environmental, labor, or other 
changes in the production practices of their suppliers is rooted in their 
oligopsonistic buyer power. It has usually depended on having a ready 
array of alternative suppliers, which allows retailers to make the credible 
threat that suppliers reluctant to comply with retailer product or process 
requirements will be replaced by others who comply.127 This is, for 
example, the dynamic behind the success of NGO-pressured European 
retailers in reforming the labor practices of Zambian horticultural 
producers,128 or the success of US retailers and large produce buyers in 
forcing California leafy greens growers to change their field management 
practices in ways perceived129 to reduce the threat of food borne illness.130 
 Yet in the case of the US market for meat, the large retailers targeted 
by NGOs are hardly supply chain Goliaths dictating product and process 
terms to a sea of producer and processor Davids. Rather, in seeking a shift 
to a supply of meat produced without the prophylactic and growth 
promoting use of antibiotics, retailers are dealing with a highly 
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concentrated meatpacking sector with a small number of powerful actors 
just upstream of them in the supply chain.131 Often controlling key 
production decisions (including decisions on antibiotic use) within the 
context of contract farming or vertical integration,132 the meatpacking 
companies are the critical link between targeted retailers and the US 
agricultural producers. Their market power directly influences the 
antibiotic use decisions of their own upstream suppliers: feedlots and 
livestock producers. 
 While retailers have tried to balance some of this power through the 
development of own-brand meat lines and products,133 retail brand meats 
are still supplied by the same few packers behind the national brands, 
while the national meat brands controlled by the packers are still quite 
popular among US meat consumers. These dynamics suggests retailer 
dependence on the large US meat companies, the same companies that 
NGOs want the retailers to influence.134 As meat-loving US consumers 
continue to seek out their favorite meat products and brands, dire 
competitive consequences are likely to befall mainstream retailers whose 
concern over sustainability or public health implications of the available 
meat supply prevents them from fully meeting their customers’ meat 
demand.135  
 The supply chain leverage and attendant private regulatory capacity 
of large meat retailers, including both large grocers and fast food chains, 
could be considerably boosted by a ready availability of a competitively 
priced imported supply of “antibiotic-free” meat. A credible threat of even 
a temporary switch to foreign suppliers who use no sub-therapeutic doses 
of antibiotics in the rearing of food animals could potentially get the 
attention and cooperation of US meat companies in the antibiotic-
reduction endeavor. Indeed, the recent Carl Jr’s experience suggests that 
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large US meat buyers interested in shifting to antibiotic-free or other 
sustainable meat sourcing are already shifting to an imported supply of 
antibiotic-free meat.136 
 The viability of a broader shift by a larger number of retailers and 
other big buyers to an imported supply of antibiotic-free meat remains to 
be seen. If retailers attempt such a shift, they will need an imported meat 
supply that is not only competitively priced but does not carry any more 
social and environmental liability than it relieves (e.g., an antibiotic-free 
beef supply that raises serious labor or animal welfare concerns). 
However, anything but a very short-term, leverage-generating shift to an 
imported meat supply would be a Pyrrhic victory, because it is the 
practices of US meat suppliers that the NGO initiatives in market-driven 
private regulation are trying to reform. 
C. The Uncertain Yet Broad Potential of Private Market-Based Regula-
tion    
 In the end, the real extent and limits to the private regulatory power 
and transformative influence of targeted retailers may only be revealed in 
the course of a strong and sustained NGO campaign of grocery and fast 
food retailer targeting. Individual retailers, who understandably hold their 
cards close to their chest in the face of building civil society expectations 
and NGO pressure, are the best judges of their own willingness and 
capacity to exercise buyer and bargaining power, and exert private 
regulatory authority over the antibiotic use practices of suppliers and 
producers.  
 As a lead strategy in a broader effort at private, market-driven reform 
of antibiotics in agriculture, retailer targeting may well turn out to have 
limited regulatory and practical effect on the practices of US livestock 
producers. Despite the remaining uncertainty about its regulatory value 
and practical outcomes, however, pursuing such forceful and sustained 
initiatives in market-driven private regulation through the targeting of 
retailers and other big buyers is well worth the effort.  
 Recent NGO initiatives in market-driven fisheries regulation have 
clearly suggested that even if such campaigns fail to perform as intended—
i.e., even if they fail to improve production practices through the 
successful exercise of private regulatory authority via the supply chain—
they may still be of significant regulatory and conservation value. They 
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can hasten the broader reform effort that originally motivated them, and 
do so in unexpected but fruitful ways. Importantly, they can turn targeted 
retailers and other big buyers into major beneficiaries and of expanding 
sustainable production practices as well as influential proponents of 
government regulatory interventions to attain such expansion. As 
observed in the fisheries context, NGO initiatives in market-based private 
regulation can shift the politics of public environmental regulation by 
turning retailers and other big buyers into key beneficiaries and proponents 
of strengthening such regulation.  
 Even if NGO initiatives in market-driven governance end up 
bumping against the limits of retailer capacity to exert buyer power and 
project private regulatory authority via the meat supply chain, the NGOs 
behind such initiatives can follow the example of their marine 
conservation counterparts and turn these limitations into an advantage for 
the broader reform effort: they can offer hard-pressed and reputationally-
exposed retailers the opportunity to advance antibiotic use reform by 
raising their political and policy voice.  
 Even if they don’t completely succeed in attaining their original 
private regulatory goals, NGO initiatives in private, market-driven 
environmental regulation can, therefore, still boost the public regulatory 
control of environmentally problematic industry practices.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 NGO targeting of large meat retailers (grocery and fast food 
corporations alike) appears to be a viable strategy for pursuing long-
elusive reform of antibiotic use in US meat production. Even if retailer-
focused initiatives are ultimately unable to generate private regulatory 
pressure through the market, they could still serve to motivate a new and 
important source of business support for stricter government regulation of 
antibiotic use in agriculture. This, at least, was the dynamic observed in 
the case of market-driven fisheries reform efforts. 
 The extent to which mobilizing the political power and policy 
influence of large retailers in favor of legislative and regulatory reform of 
antibiotic use in agriculture will be effective in counterbalancing the 
strong opposition of agricultural and pharmaceutical industries to such 
reform remains to be seen. Because NGOs have already tried just about 
everything else in their efforts to reform the excessive agricultural use of 
antibiotics, the retailer-focused market-based approach is more than worth 
the try.  
 
 











































340 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 5:1 
 
 
 
